The Presupposition of Truth in All Concepts and Intuitions

[this is an excerpt from my book The Impossibility of Truth: A Treatise on Anti-Logic]

Truth (or at least the concept of the existence of it in the world), as shown in the introduction, appears to be presupposed in all concepts, and also the intuitions by which those concepts are known. However, even if this appears to be the case, is it really?

I contend that it is the case because it is self-evident that all concepts and intuitions can be expressed in the form of propositions, or are propositions in- themselves, and deflationists (including Frank Ramsey) have shown that “it is true that...” can be placed in front of all propositions. For example, “Kant was a philosopher” can be changed into “it is true that Kant was a philosopher”.

Some may refute this view by arguing that propositions can be false, and therefore, “it is true that...” cannot be accurately placed in front of those propositions.

However, I suggest that a proposition must already contain their truth, or at least the possibility of their truth, within itself; and anything that does not satisfy this would not be a proposition at all. For example, “extra-terrestrial life forms exist” should be changed to “it is possible that extra-terrestrial life forms exist”, and “all snow is black” should be changed to “it is false that all snow is black”. With this new definition of a proposition, the deflationist view is still accurate, because even false propositions such as “it is false that all snow is black” can be changed into “it is true that it is false that all snow is black”.

In addition, even what J.L. Austin calls “illocutionary acts” (such as commands) contain their truth or the possibility of their truth within themselves, as all illocutionary acts can be evaluated in the form “it is true/false/possible that an illocutionary act is being performed”.

Following this, some deflationists concluded that truth was a redundant predicate, but that it is still an important one and the Aristotelian telos or purpose of formal inquiry.

There are two main areas which I disagree about this deflationist conclusion:

1. Truth cannot be redundant if it is important, and besides, according to our definition of a proposition, the modality of the truth of that proposition should be expressed within the proposition, meaning that even if truth is redundant because it presupposes all propositions, the modality of truth contained within the proposition is most definitely not redundant.

2. Truth is not a predicate. This is because, based on the logic from Kant’s critique of Descartes’ ontological argument (where Kant argued that existence was not a predicate as it presupposed all things, and so it contradicted the definition of a predicate by not being able to function particularly to a concept, but only universally to all concepts), the presupposition of truth implies that truth is not a predicate.

   
   

However, following the conclusion that truth is not a predicate, three questions can be raised:

1. How does this apply to the liar paradox and self- referential propositions? Self-referential propositions are usually unproblematic (for instance, one can state, “this sentence has five words” without problems), although they can still lead to paradoxes, and the most famous is the simplified liar paradox: “this proposition is false”. If the proposition is false, then it would be true that it is false, thus making it true, resulting in what appears to be contradictions that continue ad infinitum, with no clear answer as to whether it is true or false. A common resolution to this version of the liar paradox is by stating that “this proposition is false” is neither true nor false, however, this violates the principle of bivalence (which states that every proposition has exactly two possible truth values – true or false). Due to its violation of the principle of bivalence, it is apodictically troublesome in logical circumstances, and so is not the best solution. Another solution would be the one produced by Alfred Tarski, he suggested that each proposition had a temporary definition for truth, in their truth conditions. Because “this proposition is false” does not have these truth conditions (which is usually indicated by all propositions containing a conditional modifier or as a part of a conditional modifier as an antecedent or a consequent). However, I disagree with Tarski’s notion of truth, because metaphysically speaking, there must exist an essence or form (as elucidated by Plato) as the basis for all ontically existent beings, and if truth only has temporary definitions, then truth is ontically non-existent and is only functional rather than descriptive, which is impossible if there is no absolute rule determining this function, which in-itself, would be the essence of the ontic being of truth. Either way, truth would be ontically non-existent according to Tarski’s definition, and therefore, I have proposed another resolution to the liar paradox. I contend that in self-referential propositions, a particular predicate is contained within them as a constitutive part of their very concept of being self-referential. This predicate is the fact that self-referential propositions should have the truth of the cognitive import expressed from their self- reference judged as if it were a regular proposition, and that the self-reference is self- referential propositions is to be taken literally. Hence, in response to the liar paradox, the proposition is, in fact, false, because it states it is. If it is stated that the proposition is true, then that would be a judgement of the truth value of the proposition in-itself, and not in the content of the proposition.

2. Does this prove that truth is non-existent and meaningless? No, because truth is still existent as a conceived concept, just not a predicate. Furthermore, the conclusion that truth is not a predicate does not mean that truth is completely redundant, because truth – even when subjectively identified – can be incredibly useful, and even utilised as a means for power, as proven in Foucault’s philosophy.

3. Can truth be made a predicate? If truth is not a predicate but is not redundant, then it can be made into a predicate by particularly placing it in certain semantic situations whereby the modality of truth is significant and determines a certain outcome.

Now that it has been identified that truth presupposes all propositions and that truth is not a predicate yet is not redundant either, it can be beneficial to make a connexion to Heidegger’s notion of Seinsvergessenheit - the presupposition of Being from his Being and Time (which can be considered very similar to Kant’s theory expressed earlier), and determine whether truth presupposes Being, Being presupposes truth, or something else entirely.

On the one hand, one may argue that truth presupposes Being. This can be done by stating that if truth presupposes all concepts and intuitions, and if Being is a concept, then it logically follows through simple modus ponens that truth presupposes Being.

On the other hand, one may also argue that Being presupposes truth. This can be done by stating that if Being is innate in all conceivable concepts (as Heidegger proved), then it is also innate in the concept of truth, and thus, Being presupposes truth.

From this, it can be seen that a paradox inevitably arises, and this can be resolved by recognizing a special quality present in the concepts of truth and Being if they presuppose all concepts and intuitions. This quality is that a concept that presupposes all concepts and intuitions must also presuppose themselves. Although this may lead some to derive that then, concepts of this type are impossible by reductio ad absurdum, it is not a contradiction, and it is only deemed to be so by intuition alone (based on the principle that a concept cannot presuppose themselves). However, if this principle were true, then all forms of deduction would be impossible, because most formal systems of inquiry rely upon axioms, which presuppose themselves (i.e. the condition of their truth and the essence of themselves) yet also presuppose all others.

Hence, the Hegelian dialectic between whether truth presupposes Being or vice versa can be resolved by stating that truth and Being both are in a position similar to axioms, and they are both equally as significant in their presuppositions, yet they do still, in fact, presuppose all concepts and intuitions including themselves. Later in this treatise, it will be considered whether truth and Being are the same object, but for now, it should be assumed that they are arranged like axioms.

This “axiomatic” structuring of how truth presupposes all concepts and intuitions can then be linked to the French psychoanalyst Lacan’s concept of “The Real”. This is because Lacan explained the Real as “what resists symbolization absolutely,” or as Zizek described it, “an object that exists both as the object and as the obstacle in understanding that object at the

same time.” Thus, it can be said that when truth exists as an object and also as the object which presupposes all other objects used in understanding it or ascribing meaning to it (which Lacan thought resulted from a convergence between the Symbolic order and the Imaginary order), truth exists as the Lacanian Real (which doesn’t mean it is empirically existent).