Should I be held responsible for what I believe? (this essay was awarded a "Very High Commendation" in the John Locke Institute's Global Essay Prize)

Introduction

In this essay, I argue that I should not be held responsible for what I believe. This essay restricts responsibility to moral responsibility, and defends the standard view that there are two conditions for moral responsibility: knowledge and control. I argue that whilst some beliefs may satisfy the knowledge condition, no beliefs can satisfy the control condition. Therefore, I should not be held responsible for what I believe.

Conditions of moral responsibility for beliefs

Moral responsibility is an agent’s capacity to be praised or blamed for something. In the context of beliefs, understood as an agent’s attitude of truth towards a proposition (e.g., I believe that it is raining when I take the proposition that it is raining to be true), I am morally responsible for my beliefs if and only if I can be praised or blamed for what I believe. In this section, I argue that moral responsibility requires two conditions: knowledge and control.

The knowledge condition requires that the agent is aware of doing the thing that they are responsible for. If I perform some action unconsciously, it seems that I should not be held responsible for it in the way I am held responsible for actions that I consciously perform. As Paulina Sliwa argues, this is because knowledge is essential for intention. For example, it is unclear that Jones should be held responsible for smashing a glass while sleepwalking, since he was unaware of what he was doing. In the context of beliefs, the knowledge condition therefore requires that I am aware of what I believe. If I am not aware of believing that p, I should not be responsible for believing that p.

The control condition requires that the agent could have done otherwise. If Jones promised to call Smith on Monday but forgets to do so because he has dementia, it seems that he should not be held responsible for failing to call Smith, because this was out of his control – he could not have done otherwise. In the context of beliefs, the control condition therefore requires that I could have believed otherwise than p. If I could not have believed otherwise, then I should not be held morally responsible for believing that p, as my belief that p is out of my control.

It might be objected that Frankfurt cases demonstrate that we are responsible even when we could not have done otherwise, so control is not a necessary condition of moral responsibility. This essay leaves aside Frankfurt cases since they apply to actions, which one wills, whereas we cannot will to believe something. I defend this later in this essay. So, to be held morally responsible for my beliefs, they must satisfy both the knowledge and control conditions.

Knowledge of beliefs

As stated, the knowledge condition requires that I am aware of what I believe. It might be argued that we are always aware of all our beliefs, since beliefs are mental states, and a subject is always aware of their own mental states. For example, Sydney Shoemaker rejects the possibility of self-blind agents (agents who lack knowledge of their own mental states) on the ground that self-awareness is a condition of rational agency.

However, the possibility of discrepancies between self-reported beliefs and actual behaviour indicates that we can lack knowledge of our own beliefs. As Eric Schwitzgebel has argued, beliefs are better understood not as mental representations but as patterns of behavioural, phenomenal and cognitive dispositions, and we may lack knowledge of our dispositions. For example, if Jones throws salt over his shoulder every time he spills salt, it is natural to hold that he believes in this superstition, even if he denies this belief or is unaware of this belief.

Understanding beliefs as dispositions allows for the possibility that an agent could lack awareness of whether they believe that p. For whilst the agent could not lack awareness of a discrete mental representation, they may lack awareness of what they are disposed to do under certain circumstances. It may also be the case that another agent has better access to Jones’ belief, if they are able to assess his dispositions in a more accurate way than Jones is. So, the knowledge condition may be unsatisfied for many of our beliefs, such that I should not be held responsible for what I believe.

It is not the case that the agent is unaware of all their beliefs. Jones may lack privileged, automatic access to his beliefs since they are dispositions that he may be unaware of, but he can plausibly become aware of his beliefs by introspecting or reflecting on his dispositions. For example, Jones may lack privileged access to whether he believes in a superstition, but can become aware that he does hold this belief if he reflects on the fact that every time he spills salt, he throws salt over his shoulder.

However, introspectively reflecting on our dispositions is not infallible, and some of our beliefs may be inaccessible altogether. As Schwitzgebel argues, introspection is generally unreliable because it involves a “lack of corrective feedback [that] encourages a hypertrophy of confidence” (Schwitzgebel 260). By this, Schwitzgebel means that introspective judgements are subjective, and cannot be verified or falsified. He gives the example of an agent being confused by whether they are feeling “mild pains” or simply “itches or tingles” – there is no way to introspectively distinguish between these mental states. In the context of our beliefs, we may be unsure about what we are disposed to do, so unsure about which beliefs we hold.

In summary, only certain beliefs satisfy the knowledge condition – those dispositions that we are aware of. However, many of our beliefs are inaccessible. It follows that we may only be morally responsible for those beliefs we have knowledge of, if and only if they also satisfy the control condition.

Control of beliefs

So far, I have argued that the knowledge condition is not satisfied for many of our beliefs. In this section, I go further to argue that the control condition is not satisfied by any of our beliefs, since no belief is such that we could have believed otherwise. It follows that I should not be held responsible for anything I believe. This is for two reasons: (i) we do not have control over the beliefs we currently have, and (ii) we do not have control over the process of forming future beliefs.

Existing beliefs

We cannot control what we already believe. If I believe that it is raining, I cannot will myself to believe that it is not raining. As Moore’s paradox shows us, asserting, “it is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining” is absurd, precisely because if I accept that it is raining, then it is necessary that I also believe that it is raining, or else I would not accept the experience of the rain in the first place. Therefore, it is impossible to will any beliefs – we are not free to choose what our beliefs are, since they must align with our experiences of the world.

It might be objected that our beliefs form an internal “web” (Quine and Ullian), such that I can will myself to not believe a belief B1 by affecting another belief B2, where B1 depends on B2. Since our beliefs are interrelated and interdependent, it is argued that we can indirectly will ourselves to believe something by changing another belief in the web. However, we should reject this suggestion since it pushes the locus of control back: to control these other beliefs, we would need to control the beliefs that they depend on, and so on, in an infinite regress. Rejecting this infinite regress means the control condition is not satisfied for what we currently believe.

There is also an aspect of social conditioning in which beliefs we currently hold. One key lesson from postmodernism is that we are conditioned to accept certain beliefs and not others. The structure of society is akin to the Foucauldian panopticon – society is a self- regulating system where individuals internalise certain beliefs and values (such as standards of beauty) due to a fear of nonconformity. Which beliefs we hold reflect the milieu of the society we live in, which is out of our control. So, many of our beliefs do not satisfy the control condition.

It might be objected that individuals have indirect control over their beliefs, since they can affect the sociocultural milieus which determine their beliefs. For example, by acting to change a society’s beauty standards, an agent can control whether they hold a particular belief imposed by that beauty standard, such as that skinny people are more attractive. So there might yet be some element of control. However, not only does this overestimate the control that an agent has over a sociocultural milieu, but even if an individual has indirect control, this control only exists in virtue of performing an action (in this case, changing the sociocultural milieu).

Following the standard Humean model in which all actions have belief as a component, this pushes the question of control back – we require control over the belief component, which itself can only be indirectly affected by an action, and so on. We encounter an infinite regress again, so our existing beliefs cannot satisfy the control condition.

Forming future beliefs

Not only do we lack control over which beliefs we currently hold, but also over which future beliefs we form.

Beliefs play the role of representing the world, and I represent the world in response to how I experience the world. For example, my belief that it is raining represents the world as being a certain way, because I experience water falling from the sky. Yet how I experience the world is automatic: when I look at the sky and see water falling, I automatically experience the world as raining, so form a belief that it is raining. Beliefs can therefore be seen as automatic responses to the world around us. Since we cannot control how we experience the world around us, we cannot control which beliefs we form. So, the control condition is not satisfied for which beliefs we form.

The process of forming beliefs is also socially conditioned. Our sociocultural milieus determine how we form beliefs by providing us with the structures we use to form beliefs, such as language. As Tyler Burge argues, “if the social environment had been appropriately different, the contents of those [propositional] attitudes would have been different” (85). Burge uses the example of “Larry” who believes he has arthritis in his thigh – whether Larry has a belief about arthritis depends on whether Larry lives in a counterfactual linguistic community in which “arthritis” refers to an affliction of the joints, as it does in the actual world, or an affliction of the muscles, as it does in a different possible world. Meaning derives from our linguistic community, so our linguistic and social practices play a crucial role in determining which beliefs we hold.

Here I assume Burge’s social semantic externalism. It might be objected from a semantic internalist that the meaning of a term like “arthritis” does not depend on our social community, so our society cannot influence the content of our beliefs. Whether externalism is true is beyond the scope of this essay, but even if we reject externalism, we still have a powerful argument from the automaticity of beliefs that is sufficient to show that we lack control over which beliefs we form. So, we cannot believe otherwise – the control condition is not satisfied.

Conclusion

In conclusion, moral responsibility for beliefs requires both knowledge and control. Whilst some beliefs may satisfy the knowledge condition (as we can be aware of some of our dispositions), no beliefs can satisfy the control condition since sociocultural milieus determine which beliefs we have, and future beliefs are formed automatically. Therefore, I should not be held responsible for what I believe.

Bibliography

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Philosophy Supplementary Volume, vol. 35.––––– (2008). “The Unreliability of Naive Introspection.” Philosophical Review, vol.

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