Critical Response Essay to "Seeping Through the Pages" by Mark Trecka

In “Seeping through the Pages,” Mark Trecka argues for the main idea that identities cannot be understood through rigid and reductive categories, as these do not account for their changing natures. Trecka’s argument is justified in two parts: he begins by explaining the problem with using blood quantum laws to define Native American identity (§1), and he then analyzes a similar problem with using geographical borders to define tribal identity (§2). 

§1

Trecka asserts that using percentages of “Indian blood” to identify people as belonging to Native American tribes is wrong because biological categories fail to account for the nuances of tribal identity. 

In support of his point, Trecka begins by first equating tribal identity to simply engaging in tribal culture. This is evidenced by how Trecka says “speaking a particular tribal language, for example, might be grounds for recognition as a member of that tribe,” where a “tribal language” is a cultural practice. Since cultures are bound to be evolving over time, yet biological measurements are static, a biological indicator (blood percentage) of cultural identity (and supposedly also tribal identity) is not necessarily accurate. Identifying culture through biological measurements would wrongfully equate the qualitative nature of identity to the quantitative nature of biology. 

It could be objected that Trecka’s assumption that tribal identity is equivalent to cultural identity is wrong, as the assumption would imply that anyone at all can become part of a tribe as long as they practice the tribal culture, which intuitively seems absurd. I would argue that this implication is indeed not absurd, since the idea of a tribe is itself socially constructed and hence variable. Therefore, from definition alone, there is nothing which does not allow anyone to simply follow certain tribal cultural norms and in doing so, identify themselves as part of a tribe. Similarly in my own life, by moving from mainland China to the culturally disparate Hong Kong, I was not at all unable to become part of the “tribe” of Hong Kong. Through embracing Hong Kong’s cultural customs, I have adapted to my community and Hong Kong is now an integral part of my personal identity. 

However, one point I disagree with Trecka on is that while it is true that biological markers cannot always accurately indicate cultural identity, this does not imply that biological markers cannot still work in some cases. Biological markers may work in tribes that do not allow those without ancestral or biological connections to the tribe to identify as part of them. In these cases, biology itself becomes part of the tribal culture, so perhaps blood quantum laws would suffice.

§2

Trecka then argues that just like using blood percentages, using geographical borders to define tribal identity is also a flawed system. I agree with this because just like blood quantum laws, imposed borders do not account for the fluidity and liminality of tribal identity: border laws are static, yet ideas of tribal space and property are ever-changing. Just like the rigid categories that biological indicators of identity prescribe, these geographical indicators often miss out on the deeper intricacies of identity. As Trecka says, the Tohono O’odham identity “floats somehow in between identities considered more legitimate.” Trecka could have also considered what made certain identities “more legitimate” than others. In my opinion, these ideas of “legitimacy” have roots in colonial ideology: only by homogenizing identity can colonists establish control, as this allows colonists to impose their own narratives onto the colonized people.

In conclusion, explicit methods of categorizing tribal identity (through blood quantum and border laws) are flawed because tribal identity is not fixed, and so it must exist outside what is measurable. Beyond these explicit methods of constraining identity that Trecka addresses, it could be argued that there are also implicit methods. In their paper “Yep, I’m Gay,” Dembroff and Saint-Croix present the idea that our self-identities are dependent on unspoken social expectations regarding how we should express our identities. An example of this from my own life concerns my pride for my Chinese cultural heritage: my self-identity is strongly tied to my cultural heritage, yet others do not always believe me when I say this because I do not express this cultural identity in socially expected ways (such as wearing traditional Chinese clothing). In the same way, perhaps tribes expect people to carry out certain cultural rituals in order to identify as members of that tribe, but what if they do not? Would those people not be members of the tribe, even if they consider themselves to be?

Ultimately, reading Trecka’s essay has left me with a question that challenges my previous beliefs on identity: is identity how you define yourself, or is identity how others define you? Perhaps identity lies in the interplay and reconciliation of these two sides.